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ELIMINATING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HEALTH CARE:
A CALL FOR STATE HEALTH CARE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
LAW
Vernellia R. Randall, JD, MSN
"It might be that civil rights laws often go unenforced; it
might be that current inequities spring from past prejudice
and long standing economic differences that are not entirely
reachable by law; or it might be that the law sometimes
fails to reflect, and consequently fails to correct, the
barriers faced by people of color."
--Derrick Bell'
Equal access to quality health care is a crucial issue facing the United
States ("US").2 For too long, we have denied too many Americans equal
access to quality health care based on race, ethnicity, and gender. 3 Many
factors contribute to inequities: cultural incompetence of health care
providers, socioeconomic inequities, disparate impact of facially neutral
practices and policies, inadequacy of civil rights laws and enforcement,
and multiple forms of discrimination. These inequities exist in health
status, access to health care services, participation in health research and
1 DERRICK A. BELL, JR., AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE 52 (Basic Books 1987) [hereinafter NOT SAVED].
2 See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON UNDERSTANDING AND ELIMINATING RACIAL AND ETHNIC
DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, UNEQUAL TREATMENT:
CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTHCARE (Brian D. Smedley,
Adrienne Y. Stith & Alan R. Nelson eds., 2002), available at
http://www.iom.edu/?id=16740 (last visited June 26, 2002) [hereinafter IOM REPORT];
see also THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE HEALTH CARE
CHALLENGE: ACKNOWLEDGING DISPARITY, CONFRONTING DISCRIMINATION, AND
ENSURING EQUALITY, THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTAL AND PRIVATE HEALTH CARE
PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES (Sept. 1999), available at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/documents/crI 2h34z.pdf (last visited June
26, 2002) [hereinafter U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS I].
3 See, e.g., W. MICHAEL BYRD AND LINDA A. CLAYTON, AN AMERICAN HEALTH
DILEMMA: A MEDICAL HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE PROBLEM OF RACE,
BEGINNINGS TO 1900 (Routledge 2000) [hereinafter AN AMERICAN HEALTH DILEMMA 1);
W. MICHAEL BYRD AND LINDA A CLAYTON, AN AMERICAN HEALTH DILEMMA: A
MEDICAL HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE PROBLEM OF RACE, 1900 TO
PRESENT (Routledge 2002) [hereinafter AN AMERICAN HEALTH DILEMMA II]; see also
U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS I, supra note 2.
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receipt of health care financing.4 This inequity in health care is doubly
significant given the devastating racial inequity in health status that exists.
The combination of racial inequity in health status, institutional racism in
health care and inadequate legal protection points to a need for a major
civil rights law for health care.
I. INEQUITY IN HEALTH STATUS: BRIEF REVIEW
The need to focus specific attention on the discrimination inherent
in the institutions and structures of health care is overwhelming. Racial
minorities are sicker than white Americans; they are dying at a
significantly higher rate. These are undisputed facts. Many examples of
inequities in health status between racial/ethnic groups exist: infant
mortality rates are 2/2 times higher for blacks,5 and 1 2 times higher for
American Indians, than for whites; 6 the death rate for heart disease for
blacks is higher than for whites; 7 50 percent of all AIDS cases are among
minorities who account for only 25 percent of the U.S. population;8 the
prevalence of diabetes is 70 percent higher among blacks and twice as
high among Hispanics as among whites;9 Asian Americans and Pacific
Islanders have the highest rate of tuberculosis of any racial/ethnic group;
10
cervical cancer is nearly five times more likely among Vietnamese
American women than white women; 1 women are less likely than men to
receive lifesaving drugs for heart attacks;' 2 more women than men require
bypass surgery or suffer a heart attack after an angioplasty. 13
Yet, despite these significant health status inequities, we have
denied many Americans equal access to quality health care based on race,
ethnicity, and gender. Factors that contribute to this inequity in health care
include the following: cultural incompetence of health care providers,
socioeconomic inequities, disparate impact of facially neutral practices
4 See, e.g., U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS I, supra note 2; see also 2 THE UNITED
STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACKNOWLEDGING DISPARITY, CONFRONTING
DISCRIMINATION, AND ENSURING EQUALITY, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS
ENFORCEMENT (1999) [hereinafter U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS II].
5 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS I, supra note 2, at 11.6 id.
7 Id. (147 deaths per 100,000 for blacks compared to 105 deaths per 100,000 for whites).
8 1d.
9 1d.
'
0 Id. at 31.
l1 Id.
12 Id. at 14-15.
13 id.
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and policies, misunderstanding of civil rights laws, and discrimination
contribute to inequities in health status, access to health care services,
participation in health research, and receipt of health care financing.
Drs. Michael Byrd and Linda Clayton clearly laid out the long
history of racism and medicine in their seminal work: "An American
Dilemma: A Medical History of African Americans and the Problem of
Race, Beginnings to 1900" and "An American Dilemma: A Medical
History of African Americans and the Problem of Race, 1900 to 2000." In
their work, Drs. Byrd and Clayton show that the problem of black health
status and black health care access is a part of a long continuum of racism
and racial discrimination dating back almost 400 years. In fact, since
colonial times, the racial dilemma that affected America also distorted
medical relationships and institutions. 14 Throughout our history, we have
actively assigned racial minorities to the underfunded, overcrowded,
inferior, public health care sector.15
Historically, medical doctors and medical leadership helped to
establish and maintain a racially discriminatory health care system. They
helped to establish the slaveocracy, create the racial inferiority myths,
build a segregated health subsystem, and maintain racial bias in the
diagnosis and treatment of patients. 16 Only after 350 years of active
discrimination and neglect, were efforts made to admit minorities into the
"mainstream" health system. 17 However, these efforts were flawed and
since 1975 minority health status has steadily eroded. Consequently,
minorities continue to experience racial discrimination in access to health
care and quality of health care received. 18
Yet, current issues in health inequities are not isolated to problems
in the health system. They are the cumulative result of both past and
current racism throughout US culture. For instance, because of
institutional racism, minorities have less education and fewer educational
opportunities.' 9 Minorities are disproportionately homeless and have
14 AN AMERICAN HEALTH DILEMMA I, supra note 3; AN AMERICAN HEALTH DILEMMA II,
supra note 3.
15 id.
16 Id.
17 AN AMERICAN HEALTH DILEMMA I1, supra note 3.
18 Id.
19 In 1993, the high school dropout rate for blacks was 12.6 and 28.6 for Hispanics
compared to 7.3 for whites. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS Table 106 (2000),
available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d00/dtI06.asp (last visited June 26,
2002); see also REBECCA GORDON, LIBERO DELLA PIANA & TERRY KELEHER, FACING
THE CONSEQUENCES: AN EXAMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN U.S. PUBLIC
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poorer housing options. 20 Due to discrimination and limited educational
opportunities, minorities disproportionately work in low pay, high health
risk occupations (e.g., migrant farm workers, fast food workers, garment
industry workers). 21 Historic and present racism in land and planning
22policy also plays a critical role in minority health status. Minorities are
much more likely to have toxic materials (and other unhealthy uses) sited
in their communities than whites despite income.23 For example, over-
concentration of alcohol and tobacco outlets and the legal and illegal
dumping of pollutants pose serious health risks to minorities. 24 Exposure
to these risks is not a matter of individual control or even individual
choice. It is a direct result of discriminatory policies designed to protect
white privilege at the expense of minority health.
SCHOOLS (2000), available at http://www.arc.org/content/view/293/36/ (last visited June
26, 2002); THE PERSISTENCE OF WHITE PRIVILEGE AND INSTITUTIONAL RACISM IN
UNITED STATES POLICY, TRANSNATIONAL RACIAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE SHADOW REPORT
CERD 38-41 (2001), available at
http://www.thepraxisproject.org/tools/WhitePrivelege.pdf (last visited June 26, 2002)
[Hereinafter "The White Privilege Shadow Report"]; U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS
I, supra note 2, at 15-18.
20 Home ownership among Hispanics nationally stands at 47.3 percent and at 47.7 percent
for African-Americans, compared to 74.3 percent for the white, non-Hispanic. See, e.g.,
Deborah Kenn, Institutionalized, Legal Racism: Housing Segregation And Beyond, 11
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 35 (2001); The White Privilege Shadow Report, supra note 19, at 46-
71. 40% of homeless clients served were minorities. See HUD USER, HOMELESSNESS:
PROGRAMS AND THE PEOPLE THEY SERVE-TECHNICAL REPORT (1999), available at
http://www.huduser.org/publications/homeless/homelesstech.html (last visited June 26,
2002); see also All Other Things Being Equal: A Paired Testing Study of Mortgage
Lending Institutions 48 (April 2002) (finding that African American and Hispanic home
buyers in both Los Angeles and Chicago face a significant risk of unequal treatment
when they visit mainstream mortgage lending institutions to make pre-application
inquiries); U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 1, supra note 2, at 15-18.
21 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NUMBER OF NONFATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND
ILLNESSES INVOLVING DAYS AWAY FROM WORK BY INDUSTRY AND RACE OR ETHNIC
ORIGIN OF WORKER (2000), http://www.bls.gov/iifoshwc/osh/case/ostb1071.txt (last
visited June 26, 2002); see also U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS I, supra note 2, at 18.
22 See, e.g., The White Privilege Shadow Report, supra note 19, at 54-71; see also
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY AND NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 36 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993).
23 See, e.g., Jill E. Evans, Challenging The Racism in Environmental Racism: Redefining
The Concept of Intent, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1219 (1998); see also U.S. COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS I, supra note 2, at 18-20.
24 See, e.g., Vernellia Randall, Smoking, the African-American Community, and the
Proposed National Tobacco Settlement, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 677 (1998); see also Kathryn
A. Kelly, The Target Marketing of Alcohol and Tobacco Billboards to Minority
Communities, 5 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 33 (1992).
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II. INEQUITY IN HEALTH CARE: A BRIEF REVIEW
Compounding the racial discrimination experienced generally, is the
institutional racism in health care that affects access to health care and the
quality of health care received.25  Despite efforts to eliminate
discrimination and reduce racial segregation over the past thirty years,
little change in the quality of or access to health care for many minorities
has occurred. According to the US Commission on Civil Rights:
"Despite the existence of civil rights legislation equal
treatment and equal access are not a reality for racial/ethnic
minorities and women in the current climate of the health
care industry. Many barriers limit both the quality of health
care and utilization for these groups, including
discrimination."
26
Racial discrimination in health care delivery, financing, and
research continues to exist, and racial barriers to quality health care
manifests themselves in many ways including: lack of economic access to
health care,27 barriers to hospitals and health care institutions,28 barriers to
25 See, e.g., Marianne Engelman Lado, Unfinished Agenda: the Need for Civil Rights
Litigation to Address Race Discrimination and Inequalities in Health Care Delivery, 6
TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. (2001); see also Ren6 Bowser, Racial Profiling in Health Care:
an Institutional Analysis of Medical Treatment Disparities, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 79
(2001) [hereinafter Racial Profiling]; Vernellia R. Randall, Slavery, Segregation and
Racism: Trusting the Health Care System Ain't Always Easy! An African American
Perspective on Bioethics, 15 ST. LoUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 191 (1996) [hereinafter Slavery,
Segregation and Racism]; Vernellia R. Randall, Racist Health Care: Reforming an
Unjust Health Care System to Meet the Needs of African-Americans, 3 HEALTH MATRIX
127 (1993) [hereinafter Racist Health Care].
26 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS I, supra note 2, at 202.
27 More than 43 million Americans are uninsured with no economic access to health care.
A disproportionate number of the uninsured are racial minorities. As access to health
insurance in the United States is most often tied to employment, racial stratification of the
economy due to other forms of discrimination has resulted in a concentration of racial
minorities in low wage jobs. These jobs are almost always without insurance benefits. As
a result, disproportionate numbers of the uninsured are racial minorities. In fact, a
disproportionate number of racial minorities have no insurance, are unemployed, and are
employed in jobs that do not provide health care insurance, disqualify for government
assistance programs, or fail to participate because of administrative barriers. Gaps in
health status, and the absence of relevant health information, are directly related to access
to health care.
28 The institutional/structural racism that exists in hospitals and health care institutions
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29physicians and other providers, racial discrimination in medical
treatment,30 discriminatory policies and practices, 3 1 lack of language and
culturally competent care,3  disparate impact of the intersection of race
manifests itself in the (1) adoption, administration, and implementation of policies that
restrict admission; (2) the closure, relocation or privatization of hospitals that primarily
serve the minority community; and (3) the continued transfer of unwanted patients
(known as "patient dumping") by hospitals and institutions. Such practices have a
disproportionate effect on racial minorities banishing them to distinctly substandard
institutions or to no care at all.
29 Areas that are heavily populated by minorities tend to be medically under-served.
Disproportionately few White physicians have their practices located in minority
communities. Minority physicians are significantly more likely to practice in minority
communities, making the education and training of minorities extremely important. Yet,
due to discrimination in postsecondary education, racial biases in testing and quality of
life issues affecting school performance, minorities are seriously under represented in
health care professions. The shortage of minority professionals affects not only access to
health care but also access to the power and resources to structure the health care system
leaving its control almost exclusively in white hands. The result is an inadequate,
ineffective and marginalized voice on minority health care issues.
30 Differences in health status reflect, to a large degree, inequities in preventive care and
treatment. For instance, African Americans are more likely to require health care
services, but are less likely to receive them. Disparity in treatment has been well
documented in a number of studies including studies done on AIDS, cardiology, cardiac
surgery, kidney disease, organ transplantation, internal medicine, obstetrics, prescription
drugs, treatment for mental illness, pain treatment and hospital care. See, e.g., U.S.
Slavery, Segregation and Racism, supra note 25; see also Randall, Racist Health Care,
supra note 25.
31 Discriminatory policies and practices can take the form of medical redlining, excessive
wait times, unequal access to emergency care, deposit requirements as a prerequisite to
care, and lack of continuity of care, which all have a negative effect on the type of care
received. See, e.g., U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS I, supra note 2, at 74-78; see also
Sidney Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI: Defending Health Care Discrimination - It
Shouldn't be so Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 939 (1990).
32 A key challenge has been to get the Government to establish clear standards for
culturally competent health care. Culturally competent care is defined as care that is
"sensitive to issues related to culture, race, gender, and sexual orientation." Vernellia
Randall, Does Clinton's Health Care Reform Proposal Ensure [E]Qual[ity] of Health Care
for Ethnic Americans and the Poor? 60 BROOK. L. REV. 167, 205-12 (1994). Cultural
competency involves ensuring that all health care providers can function effectively in a
culturally diverse setting; it involves understanding and respecting cultural differences. In
addition to recognizing the disparities in health status between White Americans and
minority groups, we must recognize differences within groups as well. Ethnic and racial
minority communities include diverse groups with diverse histories, languages, cultures,
religions, beliefs, and traditions. This diversity is reflected in the health care they receive
and the experiences they have with the health care industry. Without understanding and
incorporating these differences, health care cannot be provided in a culturally competent
manner. See, e.g., U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS I, supra note 2, at 52-54.
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and gender,33 inadequate inclusion in health care research,34 and rationing
31through managed care.
33 The unique experiences of women of color have been largely ignored by the health care
system. These women share many of the problems experienced by minority groups, in
general, and women, as a whole. However, race discrimination and sex discrimination
often intersect to magnify the difficulties minority women face in gaining equal access to
quality health care. In addition to barriers restricting access to health care for
racial/ethnic minorities, there are barriers to care that predominantly affect minority
women. There are also gender differences in medical use, provision of treatments, and
inclusion in research. This is partly the result of different expectations of medical care
between men and women and of gender bias of health care providers. See, e.g., U.S.
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 1, supra note 2, at 47-50; see also Lisa C. Ikemoto, The
Fuzzy Logic of Race and Gender in the Mismeasure of Asian American Women's Health
Needs, 12. 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 799 (1997); Diane E. Hoffmann and Anita J. Tarzian, The
Girl Who Cried Pain: a Bias Against Women in the Treatment of Pain, 29 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 13 (2001); Michelle Oberman and Margie Schaps, Women's Health and Managed
Care, 65 TENN. L. REV. 555 (1998); Carol Jonann Bess, Gender Bias in Health Care: a
Life or Death Issue for Women with Coronary Heart Disease, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J.
41 (1995).
34 Despite volumes of literature suggesting the importance of race, ethnicity, and culture
in health, health care, and treatment, there is relatively little information available on the
racial, ethnic, and biological differences that affect the manifestations of certain illnesses
and their treatments. In response to years of exclusion of minorities and women, several
statutory requirements have been enacted to ensure that research protocols include a
diverse population. The health condition of women and minorities will continue to suffer
until they are included in all types of health research. See, e.g., U.S. COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS 1, supra note 2, at 109-117, Pub. L. No. 103-43, 107 Stat. 122 (codified in
scattered sections of 8 and 42 U.S.C. (1994 & Sup 11 1996)).
35 The health care financing system has been steadily moving to managed care as a means
of rationing health care. Without proper oversight, oversight that does not currently exist,
managed care will, over time, tend to place increasingly stringent requirements on
providers. They may fail to develop more expensive but culturally appropriate treatment
modalities, and they may refuse or minimize the expenditures necessary to develop
adequate infrastructure for minority communities. The potential for discrimination,
particularly racial/ethnic discrimination to occur in the context of managed care is
significant and is recognized as such by OCR and leading commentators and advocates
for civil rights in health care services, financing, and treatment. However, little has been
to protect minorities from this risk of discrimination. See, e.g., Vernellia R. Randall,
Impact of Managed Care Organizations on Ethnic Americans and Under Served
Populations, 5 J. HEALTH CARE FOR THE POOR UNDERSERVED 224 (1994); Vemellia R.
Randall, Managed Care, Utilization Review, and Financial Risk Shifting: Compensating
Patients for Health Care Cost Containment Injuries, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 3
(1994).
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III. INADEQUACY OF FEDERAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
PROTECTION
Several federal laws address access to health care: Title XVIII
(Medicare) 36and Title XIX (Medicaid) 37 of the Social Security Act, Title
IX,38 and the Hill Burton Act. 39 The only federal law related to eliminating
racial discrimination in health care delivery is Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act.4
°
Racial inequality in health care persists in the United States despite
laws against racial discrimination, in significant part because of the
inadequacy of Title VI.41 On its face, Title VI (with its implementing
regulations) should be an effective tool for eliminating racial
discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides the legal force for
desegregation efforts in health care.42 Specifically, Section 601 of Title VI
provides: "No person in the United States, shall, on the grounds of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance.,
43
In short, Title VI appears to prohibit discrimination of all kinds.
Still, nothing in anti-discrimination law is as simple as it might appear.
While, several problems are that make Title VI and ineffective tool,
among the most significant is the interpretation by the Supreme Court that
Title VI only addresses intentional discrimination only. Further,
36 Social Security Amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-97, Titles XVIII, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (the
act does not contain any general anti-discrimination clauses although the implementing
regulations require providers and facilities to abide by Title VI).
37 id.
38 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (2002) (limited to sex discrimination in educational programs).
39 42 U.S.C. §§ 291a-291(o) (2002) (requires uncompensated care and community service
by facilities that receive funding under Hill-Burton Acts).
40 See, e.g., DAVID BARTON SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED: RACE AND HEALING A
NATION (Univ. of Michigan Press 1999) [hereinafter HEALTH CARE DIVIDED]; see also
David Barton Smith, Addressing Racial Inequities In Health Care: Civil Rights
Monitoring And Report Cards, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 75 (1998); Randall, Racist
Health Care, supra note 25.
41 See, e.g., Barbara Noah, Racial Disparities in the Delivery of Health Care?, 35 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 135 (1998); see also Daniel K. Hampton, Title VI Challenges by Private
Parties to the Location of Health Care Facilities: Toward a Just and Effective Action, 37
B.C. L. REV. 517 (1996); Marianne L. Engelman Lado, Breaking the Barriers of Access
to Health Care. a Discussion of the Role of Civil Rights Litigation and the Relationship
Between Burdens of Proof and the Experience of Denial, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 239 (1994).
42 Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (1964)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-200d-4 (2005)).
43 -
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regulatory agencies have interpreted Title VI to exclude physicians in
private practice.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has held in Alexander v.
Choate 44 that Title VI itself directly reached only instances of intentional
discrimination; included in the definition is subtle discrimination. Subtle
discrimination 45 is enerally considered intentional based on large part on
micro-aggressions 4 with the primary difference being the reliance on
circumstantial evidence to improve intent.47 However, the reliance on
intent, subtle or direct, is particularly problematic for health care where
most discrimination is either disparate impact discrimination or
"unthinking or unconscious.
' 4 8
[T]he course of treatment physicians . . . recommend to
their patients may be influenced by stereotypical beliefs
about the behavior of their patients. Physicians . ..may
believe that poor and minority patients are more likely to
break appointments and to misunderstand complex
information, and less likely to adhere to their orders. These
44 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
15 See, e.g., Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities: Race, Retaliation and the Promise of
Title VII, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 529 (2003); cf Lynn v. Regents of Univ. of
California, 656 F.2d 1337, 1343 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981). In Lynn v, Regents, the court said:
"We are saying only what Title VII commands: when plaintiffs establish that decisions
regarding academic employment are motivated by discriminatory attitudes relating to
race or sex, or are rooted in concepts which reflect such discriminatory attitudes, however
subtly, courts are obligated to afford the relief provided by Title VII." Id.
46 See Peggy C. Davis, Law as Micro-aggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1576 (1989).
47 See Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination Law Revisited:
A Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REv. 651, 662-63 (2000) (noting the
inability of easily distinguishing direct and circumstantial evidence in the employment
discrimination context); cf Michael Selmi, Subtle Discrimination: A Matter of
Perspective Rather Than Intent, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 657, 667 n.40 (2003)
("The distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence is often a difficult one to
make, and in recent years courts have narrowed the range of behavior that is defined as
'direct evidence").
48 See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche, Race and Discretion in American Medicine, 1 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 95, 95-96 (2001) (noting that since 1999 topic of racial bias
in American health care has been targeted as topic for research, discussion and
intervention by variety of public and private sector initiatives); see also Bowser, Racial
Profiling, supra note 25 (discussing racial bias in medicine and reviewing medical
literature demonstrating that African Americans receive lower quality health care than
similarly situated white patients); Noah, Racial Disparities in the Delivery of Health
Care, supra note 41 (discussing "racial bias in the delivery of [health] care"); Mary
Crossley, Infected Judgment: Legal Responses to Physician Bias, 48 VILL. L. REv. 195
(2003).
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perceptions may affect-perhaps subconsciously-the
decision-making process and lead physicians to refrain
from orders that require patient compliance and to hesitate
before recommending certain procedure if they assume the
patient does not live in an environment that is conducive to
the aftercare needed for the best outcomes of the procedure
49
While legal standards for discrimination have not always centered
on intent, they do so now. To prove a disparate treatment claim an
individual must show that the defendant intentionally discriminated.5'
Such a standard means that few of the discriminatory acts that occur in the
health care system can be successfully litigated since most occur from
"unthinking" or "unconscious" biases.
Psychiatric, psychological, and legal literature generally support
the idea that, in our society, most contemporary discrimination is based
more on unconscious bias and stereotyping rather than on conscious
52bigotry. As suggested by Professor Lawrence:
49 See, e.g., MARIAN E. GORNICK, VULNERABLE POPULATIONS AND MEDICARE SERVICES:
WHY Do DISPARITIES EXIST? 43 (Century Found. 2000) (noting that physicians may
believe that minority patients are more likely to misunderstand complex information and
less likely to adhere to doctor's orders).
50 See, e.g., Jessie Allen, A Possible Remedy for Unthinking Discrimination, 61 BROOK.
L. REV. 1299 (1995) [hereinafter Unthinking Discrimination] (arguing that the failure to
cover non-motivational forms of discrimination under Title VII "may actually discourage
employers ... from acknowledging, let alone actively investigating, the risks of their own
unconscious racism," because "[t]hey receive no credit for doing so and may subject
themselves to greater potential liability").
5 id
52 Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) [hereinafter Unconscious Racism];
see also IOM REPORT, supra note 2; David B. Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination,
141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 967-72 (1993) (setting forth theory of negligent discrimination
under Title VII); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988). See generally Ann C. McGinley, Viva La Evolucion!:
Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415 (2000);
Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging Cronyism Defense and Affirmative Action: A Critical
Perspective on the Distinction Between Colorblind and Race Conscious Decision Making
Under Title VII, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003 (1997); Unthinking Discrimination, supra note
50, at 1299-1304 (asserting that the failure of civil rights laws is related to the reluctance
to expand the definition of discrimination to include an objective standard that would
address unconscious use of stereotypes); JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND
REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 68-80 (New
York Univ. Press 1997); Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Forward: In
Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1976); Judith
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Traditional notions of intent do not reflect the fact that
decisions about racial matters are influenced in large part
by factors that can be characterized as neither intentional-
in the sense that certain outcomes are self-consciously
sought-nor unintentional-in the sense that the outcomes
are random, fortuitous, and uninfluenced by the decision-
maker's beliefs, desires, and wishes.
53
The problem confronting the legal system is that an individual who
holds a negative stereotype about a group is more likely to discriminate
against an individual that fits the stereotype. 54 This stereotype-linked bias
is both an automatic process and an unconscious one.55 Furthermore, it
occurs even among persons who are not prejudiced. 56According to
Professor David Williams, several factors contribute to the unbiased
discrimination in health care:
First, healthcare providers are a part of the larger society
that views racial and ethnic minorities negatively on
multiple social dimensions . . . Second, research on
Olans Brown et al., Some Thoughts About Social Perception and Employment
Discrimination Law: A Modest Proposal for Reopening the Judicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY
L.J. 1487, 1493-97 (1997); Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures
in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 466-67 (1998); Peggy C. Davis, Law as
Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1560 (1989); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But
Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91
MICH. L. REv. 953_passim (1993); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and tie
Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 1016 passim (1988); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil
Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REv. 1251,
1279, 1286-91 (1998) [hereinafter Krieger I]; Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of
Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1164 (1995) [hereinafter Krieger II]; Anne C.
McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent
Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1463-73 (1996); David Benjamin
Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 899, 900-17 (1993); Michael
Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate, 42
UCLA L. REv. 1251, 1283-89 (1995); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the
Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 935, 960-62 (1989); Pamela S. Karlan,
Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93
YALE L.J. 111, 124-28 (1983).
53 Unconscious Racism, supra note 52 (suggesting that racism is so ingrained that it can
be classified neither as intentional nor as unintentional).
54 David R. Williams, Race, Health, And Health Care, 48 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 13 (Fall
2003); see IOM REPORT, supra note 2, at 171-173.
55 Id.
56 Id.
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stereotypes indicates that encounters in the healthcare
setting contain ingredients that enhance the likelihood of
the use of stereotypes. Stereotypes are more likely to be
activated under conditions of time pressure, the need to
make quick judgments, cognitive overload, task complexity
and when the emotions of anger or anxiety are present...
Third, . . . [physicians view their Black patients] . . . more
negatively than their white counterparts. . . . Physicians
viewed Black patients (compared to their white
counterparts) as less likely to adhere to medical advice, less
likely to be kind, intelligent and educated, more likely to
lack social support, and more likely to abuse alcohol and
drugs.57
However, notwithstanding that the discrimination is based on some
unconscious or unthinking processes, an individual can change58:
Social psychological research, reviewed here in four major
sections, explains that stereotyping, prejudice, and
discrimination have (1) some apparently automatic aspects
and (2) some socially pragmatic aspects, both of which tend
to sustain them. But, as research also indicates, change is
possible, for (3) stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination
seem individually controllable, and consequently, (4) social
7 Williams, Race, Health, And Health Care, supra note 54.
58 See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Other People: The Impact of Power on
Stereotyping, 48 AM. PSYCHOL. 621, 627 (1993) ("Our main program of research... has
been showing that social structure affects attention, and if people pay more attention, at
least some of them are less likely to stereotype"); Susan T. Fiske & Peter Glick,
Ambivalence and Stereotypes Cause Sexual Harassment: A Theory with Implications for
Organizational Change, J. SOC. ISSUES, 1995, at 97, 110-12 (discussing ways in which
organizations can decrease the effect of stereotyping); Samual L. Gaertner et al.,
Reducing Intergroup Bias: Elements of Intergroup Cooperation, 76 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 388, 398 (1999) ("Any intergroup activity that induces the perception of
common identity among the groups has the potential to reduce intergroup bias, with or
without the components of intergroup cooperative interaction"); Steven L. Neuberg, The
Goal of Forming Accurate Impressions During Social Interactions: Attenuating the
Impact of Negative Expectancies, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 374, 374 (1989)
(arguing that having a goal of forming accurate impressions reduces the detrimental
impact of negative expectancies); Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability: A Social Check on
the Fundamental Attribution Error, 48 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 227, 233 (1985) (discussing
how accountability or requiring people to justify their decisions can result in "debiasing"
under certain circumstances).
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structure influences their occurrence. . . .The bad news is
that people's habitual use of subjectively diagnostic
information, certain information configurations, and
perceived co-variation sustains stereotypes. . . . The good
news is that people can sometimes control even apparently
automatic biases, if appropriately motivated, given the right
kind of information, and in the right mood. People
therefore can make the hard choice.
59
Recognizing, the need to get at more than intentional
discrimination the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) which was delegated the
responsibility of enforcing Title VI and Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) issued inteTretive regulations which provided for
disparate impact discrimination:
A recipient ... may not ... utilize criteria or methods of
administration which have the effect of subjecting
individuals to discrimination of their race, color or national
origin, or have the effect of defeating or substantially
impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program
as respect individuals of a particular race, color, or national
origin.61
The regulations defined a recipient as any public or private entity
or individual that receives federal financial assistance. 62 Federal financial
assistance includes federal money awarded through grant, loan, or
contract.6 3 Because of these two definitions, Title VI, had the potential of
having a broad range effect. Once a program or individual has been
determined to violate Title VI, the program or individual "must take
59 Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination, in 2 HANDBOOK ON SOC.
PSYCHOL. 357 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998).
60 See H.R. Doc. No. 318 (1964). See generally Mitchell Rice & Woodrow Jones, Jr.,
Public Policy Compliance/Enforcement and Black American Health. Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, in HEALTH CARE ISSUES IN BLACK AMERICA: POLICIES, PROBLEMS
AND PROSPECTS 100-17 (Woodrow Jones, Jr. & Mitchell F. Rice eds., 1987); Watson,
Reinvigorating Title VI: Defending Health Care Discrimination-it Shouldn't Be So Easy?,
supra note 31, at 943-48 (1990).
61 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1991) (emphasis added).
62 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(i) (1991).
63 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d-I (1981); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d-4 (1981).
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affirmative action to overcome the effects of prior discrimination.,
64
Furthermore, the regulations went further and prohibited:
* Criteria or methods of administration which have the effect
of subjecting individuals to discrimination; 65 criteria or
methods of administration which have the effect of
defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the
objectives of the program;6 6
* Difference in quality of services;
6 7
* Differences in quantity or the manner in which the benefit
is provided;68 and,
* Locating services with the purpose or effect of excluding
individuals from the benefits of the program.
69
In theory then Title VI regulation should improve access to and
quality of health care services. Title VI regulations clearly prohibit
policies and practices that result in segregation within and between
institutions. Title VI's regulations had the potential of forcing health care
practitioners and institutions to evaluate their policies and practices that
have a disparate impact on racial minorities. 70 Unfortunately, because of
Alexander v. Sandoval and unique problems of health care discrimination,
Title VI and its regulations are virtually useless.
In Sandoval, the court held in a five-to-four decision that despite a
line of Title VI precedents, that disparate impact regulation issued under §
602 could only be enforced through a private right of action. 71 Since the
law requires a conscious discriminatory purpose or intent, individual
discrimination claims cannot address the issue of unconscious
discrimination and health care providers will not be "appropriately
motivated" to make the hard choice.72
64 45 C.F.R. § 80.3 (b)(6)(i) (1991).
6' 45 C.F.R. § 80.3 (b)(1)(vii)(2) (1991).
66 45 C.F.R. § 80.3 (b)(1)(vii)(2) (1991).
67 45 C.F.R. § 80.3 (b)(1)(i) (1991).
68 45 C.F.R. § 80.3 (b)(1)-(3) (1991).
69 Id.
70 In Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), the Supreme Court made it clear that a
claim seeking a remedy for discrimination based on disparate impact under Title VI must
involve a violation of agency regulations promulgated under § 602.
71 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001).
72 See, e.g., Unthinking Discrimination, supra note 50; Interestingly, some members of
Congress clearly understand the difference between conscious and unconscious bias. For
instance, in its discussion of the American with Disabilities Act (ADA), several members
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Even without the problem with Sandoval Title VI enforcement has
been problematic 73 First, although required by regulation to produce
data,74 the Office of Civil Right's ("OCR") Title VI enforcement effort has
produced little consistent data for evaluating Title VI compliance.75
Second, there has been "little uniformity in how different states handle
Title VI requirements, little guidance, little analysis of the information
collected by this process, no research and development."7'6 Third, Title VI
lacks specific definitions of prohibited discrimination and acceptable
remedial action.77 Fourth, OCR has relied on individual complaints to
enforce Title VI. 78 Finally, Title VI would have limited application to
health care treatment discrimination since HEW has interpreted Title VI to
not apply to private physicians who received money for treating patients
covered under Medicare Part B. 79 Thus, under Title VI physicians would
not be recipients of federal financial assistance and consequently not
covered by Title VI. 80
Taking the "even if' a step further, even if the problems with Title
VI enforcement did not exist and Title VI functioned perfectly; the health
care industry presents unique problems that would still make Title VI
ineffective. Furthermore, the health care system presents several additional
problems. First, as with the situation when racial minorities use housing
explained that the ADA was intended to address "institutional, structural, and
psychological barriers." 136 CONG. REc. H2599, H2622 (daily ed. May 22, 1990)
(statement of Rep. Hoyer); see also 135 CONG. REc. S10765, S10802 (daily ed. Sept. 7,
1989) (statement of Sen. Heinz).
73 See, e.g., Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI: Defending Health Care Discrimination-it
Shouldn't Be So Easy?, supra note 31; Racist Health Care, supra note 25; Lado,
Breaking The Barriers Of Access To Health Care. A Discussion Of The Role Of Civil
Rights Litigation And The Relationship Between Burdens Of Proof And The Experience
Of Denial, supra note 41; Hampton, Title VI Challenges By Private Parties To The
Location Of Health Care Facilities: Toward A Just And Effective Action, supra note 41.
14 28 C.F.R. § 42.406(a) (1992); 45 C.F.R. § 80.6(b) (1991).
7' See, e.g., Sidney Watson, Health Care in the Inner City: Asking the Right Question, 71
N.C. L. REv. 1647 (1993).
76 See, e.g., Smith, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED, supra note 40.
17 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b) (1991); Watson, Health Care in the Inner City, supra
note 75.
78 id.
79 Id.
80 But see Lesley v. Chie, 250 F.3d 47, 53 (1st Cir. 2001) (discussing physicians' receipt
of Medicaid funds in relationship to the Rehabilitation Act.); Howe v. Hull, 874 F. Supp.
779, 789 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (discussing physicians' receipt of Medicare and Medicaid
funds in relationship to the Rehabilitation Act); However, it is open question whether
physicians who receive payment through a managed care plan will be covered.
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and lending institutions, individuals are, for the most part, totally unaware
that the provider or institution has discriminated against them. Similarly,
because of the very specialized knowledge required in medical care,
individuals can be totally unaware that the provider has injured them.
Finally, the health care system, through managed care, has actually built in
incentives that encourage "unconscious" discrimination. Because of these
issues, an appropriate legal structure is essential to eliminating
discrimination in health care.
IV. STATE HEALTH CARE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACT
In an effective public health policy, appropriate state and federal
laws must be available to eliminate discriminatory practices in health care.
Thus, the crux of the problem, given managed care, the historical inequity
in health care, and "unthinking discrimination," the laws do not address
the current barriers faced by minorities. The executive branch, the
legislatures and the courts are singularly reluctant to hold health care
institutions and providers responsible for institutional racism. As the
United States Commission on Civil Rights found:
There is substantial evidence that discrimination in health
care delivery, financing and research continues to exist.
Such evidence suggests that Federal laws designed to
address inequality in health care have not been adequately
enforced by federal agencies ... [Such failure has] ...
resulted in a failure to remove the historical barriers to
access to quality health care for women and minorities,
which, in turn has perpetuated these barriers. 81
Health Care Anti-Discrimination Act should be enacted which would
(1) recognize multiple forms of discrimination (2) authorize and fund
testers, (3) assure fines & regulatory enforcement (4) require a health
scorecard/report for health agency, provider or facility, and (5) require
data collection and reporting.
81 See, e.g., U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS II, supra note 4, at 275-276.
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A. Recognize Multiple Forms of Discrimination
Racial inequity in medical treatment rarely occurs because of
overt, intentional discrimination behavior. Most race discrimination that
occurs in health care is probably the result of subconscious bias,
disproportionate impact of policies and practices, disparate impact. A
state law on health care discrimination would at a minimum define
discrimination in a way that included: intentional discrimination, subtle
discrimination,82 unthinking discrimination 83 and disparate impact.84 The
law should define intentional discrimination to include knowledge of
disparate impact and failure to take effective steps to reduce impact.
Furthermore, any affirmative defenses, such as business necessity, should
be limited and narrowly defined.
B. Authorize and Fund the Use of Medical Testers
To discourage health care discrimination, an 'aggrieved person'
should include not only the individual who has been injured, but also one
who believes that he or she will be injured, as well as individuals engaged
as testers and organizations engaged in testing. In testing, the testing
organization sends persons pretending to be patients who share common
traits or symptoms except their race to health care facilities or providers to
prove that patients of a particular race receive different treatment.85 This is
82 Subtle discrimination is not necessarily the same as unconscious discrimination.
Conscious discrimination can be directed in subtle ways. Michael Selmi, Response to
Professor Wax Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233
(1999); see also ELIZABETH YOUNG-BRUEHL, THE ANATOMY OF PREJUDICES 73 (Harvard
Univ. Press 1996); Selmi, Subtle Discrimination: a Matter of Perspective Rather than
Intent, supra note 47.
83 See, e.g., Unthinking Discrimination, supra note 50 (advocating strict liability for
unconscious discrimination).
84 Cf Justin D. Cummins, Refashioning the Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact
Doctrines in Theory and in Practice, 41 How. L. J. 455, 468 (1998) (suggesting that
problem is not the requirement of intent but how discriminatory intent is defined and
proposing that a more comprehensive intent standard, which includes unconscious bias,
be adopted); Amy Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1206 (1999)
(asserting that the costs of remedying unconscious discrimination are too high for
employers to bear, and the victims of discrimination are the "cheapest cost avoiders").
85 See, e.g., Stan Dom et al., Anti-Discrimination Provisions and Health Care Access, 20
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 439, 441, 441 n.27 (1986); Desnick v. American Broadcasting, 44
F.3d 1345, 1352 (7th Cir. 1995) (use of test patients with concealed cameras did not
support claim for trespass under Illinois law, infringement of right of privacy, or illegal
wiretapping).
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important because much of health care discrimination goes unnoticed,
unsuspected, undetected, or unreported.
Even in cases where discrimination is suspected, the victim will
have an almost impossible time developing adequate proof because there
will be almost no opportunity to witness better treatment to a similarly
situated white patient. "Testing" could provide both evidence in the
individual case and some accurate empirical data on the overall rate at
86
which discrimination occurs in health care. Testing has been widely used
to enforce Title VIII, 87 which prohibits discrimination in the sale,
advertising, and rental of housing. However, while use of tests under
Title VIII is well-settled, it is an issue of great debate in other areas, such
as employment discrimination under Title V11 89 and section 1981 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.90 A statute that authorizes the use of testers will
bypass that debate in the courts because the Supreme Court has already
noted that "Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion
of which creates standing, although no injury would exist without the
statute." 91
86 See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car
Negotiations, 104 HARv. L. REv. 817 (1991) (conducting rigorous testing for gender and
race discrimination in new-car purchase negotiations and disclosing that women and
minorities fare significantly worse in such negotiations than white males); Stephen E.
Haydons, A Measure of Our Progress: Testing for Race Discrimination in Public
Accommodations, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1207 (1997).
87 42 U.S.C. § 3604.
88 See, e.g., Haydons, A Measure of Our Progress: Testing for Race Discrimination in
Public Accommodations, supra note 86; Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman. 455 U.S. 363
(1982) (unanimous Court endorsing the use of testers).
89 See, e.g., Michael J. Yelnosky, Filling an Enforcement Void Using Testers to Uncover
and Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-Skilled, Entry-Level Jobs, 26 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 403 (1993) (arguing that Congress should amend Title VII to give the
EEOC the power to use testers to uncover discrimination in hiring for lower-skilled,
entry-level jobs); Alex S. Navarro, Note, Bona Fide Damages for Tester Plaintiffs: An
Economic Approach to Private Enforcement of the Antidiscrimination Statutes, 81 GEO.
L.J. 2727 (1993) (arguing that testers should receive damage awards comparable to non-
tester plaintiffs).
90 See, e.g., Michelle Landever, Note, Tester Standing in Employment Discrimination
Cases Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 381 (1993) (arguing that
employment testers have standing to sue under § 1981).
91 Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973) (citing Hardin v. Kentucky
Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1, 6, (1968)).
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C. Provide a Private and Organizational Right of Action
An anti-discrimination health care statute would provide for a
private right of action and organizational right of action. The private right
of action would assure that individuals (including testers) would have
standing to sue not only under the statute but also under any implementing
regulations; thus, avoiding the problem that occurred in federal civil rights
enforcement. Furthermore, there are many reasons why limiting
enforcement to state agencies may be inadequate. For instance, the agency
may not have sufficient staff to devote the resources necessary to enforce
the civil rights violations. 92 Administrative complaints with state agencies
rather than going to court may limit some avenues of redress. State
agencies may be limited in their capacity to mandate redress for aggrieved
plaintiffs.93 Without a private right of action, racial discrimination in
health care will be impossible to eliminate.
94
In addition to the private right of action, an organizational right of
action is essential to allowing testing to be carried out more broadly by
civil rights organizations. These organizations and testers would have
standing to sue and could recoup the costs of testing programs. This
would provide the necessary incentive for civil rights organizations to
create testing programs and make their existence known to potential
victims of discrimination.
D. Establish Equality Health Care Council
The act should establish "Health Care Council," patterned after
Fair housing councils. This council could serve several distinct functions,
including educating the public, training health care providers and
institutions, providing counseling and health care-finding services to
individuals, investigating discrimination complaints-mostly through
testing-and pursuing legal remedies. 95 Such council would provide a
focal point, anti-discrimination work in health care. 96 It could easily be an
extension of existing state minority health efforts. Thus, when someone
92 See, e.g., Derek Black, Picking up the Pieces after Alexander V. Sandoval:
Resurrecting a Private Cause of Action for Disparate Impact, 81 N.C. L. REV. 356
(2002).
93 Id.
94 See id.
95 See, e.g., Haydons, A Measure of Our Progress: Testing for Race Discrimination in
Public Accommodations, supra note 86.
96 See, e.g., Fair Housing Council Finds Discrimination Against Hispanics in DC, 66
Number 40 Interpreter Releases 1154 (Oct. 16, 1989).
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believes she has been discriminated against in a health care, she would
have somewhere to turn for help.
E. Prevailing Party Attorney Fees
The health care anti-discrimination statute would provide for
attorneys' fees for a prevailing party.9 7 Many federal statutes authorize
attorneys' fees for a prevailing party.98 The statute should grant prevailing
party status when, because of the law suit, a party's ends are
accomplished. Under the catalyst theory, the focus is on whether the party
obtained its desired result, despite whether the party obtained a favorable
ruling. Prevailing Party Attorney Fees would help to provide the financial
incentives needed to pursue.
99
F. Punitive Damage, in Part or in Whole, to Fund Monitoring and
Assessment Programs
Compensatory damages make discrimination victims whole for
injuries to their injuries.100 Punitive damages, on the other hand, punish
past conduct, teach defendants not to commit these acts again and deter
others from similar behavior.10 1 Similar to split-recovery statutes,0 2 all or
97 See, e.g., Macon Dandridge Miller, Catalysts as Prevailing Parties under the Equal
Access to Justice Act, 69 U. CHL. L. REv. 1347 (2002).
98 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 259 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1994)); Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994 & Supp. 2000)); Equal
Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96- 481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §
504, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1994 & 1998 Supp.)); 66 Stat. 813 (1952) (codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 285 (1994)).
99 See, eg, Stanton v. Southern Berkshire Regional School District, 197 F.3d 574, 577
(1st Cir. 1999) (interpreting prevailing party to include catalysts); Marbley v. Bane, 57
F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing the catalyst theory as a viable form of recovery
as a prevailing party); Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Housing Authority, 21 F.3d 541, 551
(3d Cir. 1994) (holding that "there is no legal impediment to application of the 'catalyst
theory' to show that plaintiffs were 'prevailing parties' notwithstanding the absence of a
judgment or consent decree"); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.2d 915,
919 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that a party can achieve prevailing party status without
having received a final judgment in its favor).
100 Jason P. Pogorelec, Under What Circumstances Did Congress Intend to Award
Punitive Damages for Victims of Unlawful Intentional Discrimination Under Title VII?,
40 B.C. L. REv. 1269 (1999).
101 See e.g, id; H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I) at 64-65 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.S.C.A.N.
549, 602-03.
102 As of 2003, 12 states had split-recovery statutes. The twelve states are: Alaska,
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part of the punitive damages should be placed into a fund that would
ultimately be used to promote equality health care including
discrimination testing.'
1 03
G. Require Data Collection and Reporting
Current data collection efforts fail to capture the diversity of racial
and ethnic communities in the United States.'0 4 Data are aggregated
information on subgroups within the five racial and ethnic categories that
are not collected systematically. 105  Further, racial and ethnic
classifications are often limited on surveys and other data collection
instruments, and minorities are often misclassified on vital statistics
records and other surveys and censuses.' °6 To fully understand the health
status, of all individuals, as well as to recognize the barriers they face in
obtaining quality health care it is important to collect the most complete
data on underrepresented groups, and sub-populations. 107 The lack of data
on these groups makes it difficult to conduct research studies and
comparative analyses. 10 8 Furthermore, the lack of a uniform data
collection method makes obtaining an accurate and specific description of
race discrimination in health care difficult. The existing data collection
does not allow for regularly collecting race data on provider and
institutional behavior. 109
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, New York,
Oregon, and Utah.
103 See, e.g., Mathew J. Klaben, Split-Recovery Statutes: The Interplay of the Takings and
Excessive Fines Clauses, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 104, 105 (1994); Leo M. Stepanian II,
Comment, The Feasibility of Full State Extraction of Punitive Damages Awards, 32 DUQ.
L. REV. 301, 317 (1994).
104 See, e.g., David R. Williams, Race/Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status: Measurement
and Methodological Issues, 26 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVICES 483, 483-505 (1996); Sidney
D. Watson, Race, Ethnicity and Quality of Care: Inequalities and Incentives, 27 AM. J.L.
& MED. 203 (2001).
105 See, e.g., U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS I, supra note 2, at 50-52.
106 See, e.g., Williams, Race/Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status: Measurement and
Methodological Issues, supra note 104.
107 See, e.g., U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS I, supra note 2, at 50-52.
108 Williams, Race/Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status: Measurement and
Methodological Issues, supra note 104.
109 See Madison-Hughes v. Shalala, 80 F.3d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir. 1996) (dismissing for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction); U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL TITLE
VI ENFORCEMENT TO ENSURE NONDISCRIMINATION IN FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS
246 (1996); Lado, Unfinished Agenda: the Need for Civil Rights Litigation to Address
Race Discrimination and Inequalities in Health Care Delivery, supra note 25.
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Given the array of potential issues, some researchers have argued
that health data should not be disaggregated by race. 0 It could be argued
that the use of race in health data promotes and maintains the view that
race is a biological concept or that racial categorizations perpetuate and
encourage racial fragmentation. Such views see potential for harm from
the use of race.
However, there are a number of important and compelling reasons
for disaggregating health status and health care data by race. First, the use
of race is not the cause of racism but the result of racism. That is,
individuals have been discriminated against based on color; established
hierarchy and superiority are based on color. Consequently, racism and
racial discrimination will continue to exist (that is, discrimination based on
color) even if terminology change or cease to exist. For instance, even
though race data are not collected in the European Union in the same way
as they are in the United States, racism and racial discrimination continues
to exist as a worldwide problem. Here in the United States, even when one
controls for socioeconomic status, health status and health care
differentials continue to exist.
Second, racism and racial discrimination have implications for
every institution and social practice. Health status is impacted by racial
discrimination in housing, employment, environment, education, and other
institutions. Third, calls to not disaggregate data ignore the power and
status differentials that exist among all racial groups.l'This point is
illustrated when one considers the disproportionate percentage of racially
disadvantaged individuals who are poor. Fourth, as long as some groups
continue to experience discrimination, it is important to monitor their well
being.112 Fifth, to fully understand the health status of all individuals as
well as to recognize the barriers they face in obtaining quality health care,
it is important to collect the most complete data on "racially
disadvantaged" groups and "sub-groups". 13 The lack of a uniform data
collection method makes obtaining an accurate and specific description of
racial discrimination in health care difficult, if not impossible. Such data
collection has to include collecting data on provider and institutional
behavior.
110 C. Bagley, A Plea for Ignoring Race and Including Insured Status in American
Research Reports on Social Science and Medicine, 40 Soc. SCI. MED. 1017, 1017-19
(1995).
111 Williams, Race, Health and Health Care, supra note 54, at 322-333.
112 Id.
113 Randall, Racist Health Care, supra note 25, at 127-194.
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"Although not useful as a biological category, race has
been and is likely to continue to be an important social
category. It is what sociologists call a master status-a
central determinant of social identity and obligations, as
well as of access to societal rewards and resources. From
our earliest health records, race has been an empirically
robust predictor of variations in morbidity and mortality.
Collecting the appropriate data on race can facilitate
ongoing monitoring of the magnitude of differentials,
enhanced understanding of their causes and the
development of effective interventions to address them." 1 14
Race matters because racism and racial discrimination matter.
1 15
Disaggregating data based on race is important because it helps to make
the impact of racism and racial discrimination visible and thus allows us to
address the root problem.
H. Require a Health Report Card for Health Agency, Provider or
Facility"16
If we are serious about eliminating racial discrimination, the
systematic collection and reporting of data from each health care provider
on racial inequities in the use of services and the choices of diagnostic and
therapeutic alternatives would provide an additional tool in civil rights
monitoring. 11 7 The "report card" approach is not new and is being done to
"assure accountability, consumer choice, and goal-directed action."" 8
Existing and proposed health care "report cards" could be used and only
need to be stratified by race.1 9 As Sidney Watson discussed:
114 Williams, Race, Health and Health Care, supra note 54, at 322-333.
115 JAMES M. JONES, PREJUDICE AND RACISM 352-356 (McGraw-Hill 1997).
116 See, e.g., Smith, Addressing Racial Inequities in Health Care: Civil Rights Monitoring
and Report Cards, supra note 40.
117 Smith, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED, supra note 40, at 325; H. Jack Geiger, Race and
Health Care-An American Dilemma, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 815, 816 (1996); Bowser,
Racial Profiling, supra note 25.
118 See Smith, Addressing Racial Inequities in Health Care: Civil Rights Monitoring and
Report Cards, supra note 40.
''9 See, e.g., Smith, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED, supra note 40, at 326; NAT'L COMM.
QUALITY ASSURANCE, HEALTH PLAN AND EMPLOYER DATA INFORMATION SET (version
3.0 1998); Alain C. Enthoven & Carol B. Vorhaus, A Vision of Quality In Health Care
Delivery, HEALTH AFFAIRS (May/June 1997); Bowser, Racial Profiling, supra note 25.
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Reporting race-based data on health care is relatively easy
once we get over our squeamishness about talking about
race and recognize the need for this information. Physicians
already gather information on patient race as part of a
standard medical history. All this is needed is to compile
and report racial and ethnic information in a format that
protects patient confidentiality and privacy...
Report cards that reflect racial disparities will provide a strong
evidence that racism, "intentional or unintentional, institutional or
individual-is affecting patient care.'
' 2
'
I. Assure Adequate Fines and Regulatory Enforcement
The importance of rigorous enforcement of regulation as a primary
vehicle for policing health services cannot be overemphasized. The
collection of data and the development of a report care need the teeth of
regulatory enforcement. Thus, a statute which allows significant civil
penalty to be assessed for violation of regulations designed to eliminate
racial inequities is important to compliance. Current administrative
penalty involves termination of funds. Such a step is highly unlikely;
consequently, it is the effective equivalent of having no penalty at all. If
substantial fines were mandated and collected for violating anti-
discrimination law, then such fines could be collected and deposited
directly into a restricted account that could be used only to enhance and
improve racial inequities.
V. Conclusion
The questions raised are: why modifying existing federal law (i.e.,
Title VI) is insufficient or why not adopt a Health Care Anti-
Discrimination Law on the federal level? My discussion above should
answer the first question. Title VI is hopelessly flawed and minor
tinkering will not be sufficient to make it an effective tool. As to the
question of why not a new federal law, frankly the answer is political
feasibility. From a political perspective, the antagonism to civil rights
makes it highly unlikely such an approach will work. Furthermore, the
120 See, e.g., Sidney D. Watson, David Barton Smith's Health Care Divided. Race and
Healing a Nation, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 601 (2000) (book review).
121 id.
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states are major players in the civil rights arena and have an infrastructure
on which a new civil rights law could be based.
The discussion of discrimination in health care has been limited.
That discussion has centered almost entirely around Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act 122 and on assuring access to facilities and providers. 123 In an
effective public health policy, appropriate state and federal laws must be
available to eliminate discriminatory practices in health care. Thus, the
crux of the problem for the legal system: given managed care, the
historical inequity in health care, and unthinking discrimination, what is
the best way for the legal system to remedy racial discrimination in the
health care system?
122 See, e.g., Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI Defending Health Care Discrimination--it
Shouldn't Be So Easy?, supra note 31; Smith, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED, supra note 40;
Smith, ADDRESSING RACIAL INEQUITIES IN HEALTH CARE: CIVIL RIGHTS MONITORING
AND REPORT CARDS, supra note 40; Randall, Racist Health Care, supra note 25.
123 See, e.g., Noah, Racial Disparities, supra note 41; Hampton, Title VI Challenges By
Private Parties To The Location Of Health Care Facilities: Toward A Just And Effective
Action, supra note 41; Barbara A. Noah, Racist Health Care?, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 135
(1998); Lado, Breaking The Barriers Of Access To Health Care: A Discussion Of The
Role Of Civil Rights Litigation And The Relationship Between Burdens Of Proof And
The Experience Of Denial, supra note 41.
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